

La rivoluzione del ragionevole

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The Revolution of the Reasonable

Abstract: *Political Liberalism* is argued to rest on a groundbreaking non-epistemic normativity, premised on the notion of “the reasonable”. The normative credentials of “justice as fairness” are no longer equated with its being the conception of justice that rational parties would select in the “original position”, but rather with its being *the most reasonable* political conception of justice *for us*. This shift of perspective amounts to jettisoning all kinds of comprehensive liberalism, including the one articulated in *A Theory of Justice*, and grounding the defense of “justice as fairness” on a notion of being not just “reasonable”, but “most reasonable for us”, which still needs further clarification. Furthermore, *Political Liberalism* is argued to embed a highly innovative notion of legitimacy, derived from Ackerman’s “democratic dualism” but made normatively more robust by Rawls and more adequate than any of its natural competitors for making sense of the “consent of the governed” in complex contemporary societies. Finally, a comment is offered on a normative lacuna which still affects Rawls’s account of reasonable pluralism in *Political Liberalism*.

Keywords: Rawls, Political liberalism, Reasonability, Legitimacy, Ackerman, Deliberative democracy.

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